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Copyrighting the
Past?
Emerging Intellectual Property
Rights Issues in Archaeology1
by George P. Nicholas and
Kelly P. Bannister
Rights to intellectual property have become a major issue in eth-
nobotany and many other realms of research involving Indige-
nous communities. This paper examines intellectual-property-
rights-related issues in archaeology, including the relevance of
such rights within the discipline, the forms these rights take,
and the impacts of applying intellectual property protection in
archaeology. It identifies the “products” of archaeological re-
search and what they represent in a contemporary sociocultural
context, examines ownership issues, assesses the level of protec-
tion of these products provided by existing legislation, and dis-
cusses the potential of current intellectual property protection
mechanisms to augment cultural heritage protection for Indige-
nous communities.
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“Intellectual property” is defined by Dratler (1994:1–2)
as “intangible personal property in creations of the
mind.” Intellectual property rights are legal rights to pre-
cisely defined kinds of knowledge. In general, intellec-
tual property laws “protect a creator’s expression in ar-
tistic and literary works, the proprietary technology in
inventions, the words and symbols used to identify prod-
ucts and services and the aesthetic aspects of product
designs” (Cassidy and Langford 1999:1).
Intellectual property rights are a rapidly expanding
topic of discussion in academic and other circles and a
major issue in ethnobotanical and other research in-
volving Indigenous communities.2 Interested parties rep-
resent a convergence of natural and social scientists from
government, academia, and industry, members of Indig-
enous communities, lawyers, corporate representatives,
environmentalists, and others. Key concerns expressed
by these diverse parties relate to the sociocultural, eth-
ical, and economic aspects of current intellectual prop-
erty rights legislation, among them the implications of
patenting higher life forms (e.g., CBAC 2001, 2003). For
the most part, archaeologists have yet to find themselves
thrust into this complex milieu. We argue that archae-
ologists should examine whether and in what ways in-
tellectual-property-rights-related issues are relevant to
their research, particularly when claims to such rights
may be made by Indigenous peoples affected by that
research.
The absence of archaeologists from the intellectual
property rights debate may be linked to the complexity
of the issues and to the challenges of defining “intellec-
tual property” beyond the realm of technological inno-
vation with commercial application. Such is the case
with living systems, where what qualifies as intellectual
property and is protectable by law is continually being
debated and tested, often in the courts.3 Of particular
relevance to archaeology is the application of the idea of
intellectual property rights to the protection of the cul-
2. We use “Aboriginal,” “Indigenous,” and “Native” interchange-
ably. “Aboriginal” tends to be used more commonly in Canada and
Australia. In Canada it includes First Nations, Me´tis, and Inuit.
3. See, for example, Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of
Patents) 2002 SCC 76. File No. 28155 December 5 (http://
www.texum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/2002/vol4/html/
2002scr4_0046.html) and the reexamination of U.S. Plant Patent
No. 5,751, the “Da Vine Patent” on the Amazonian rain-forest plant
Banisteriopsis caapi, issued June 17, 1986, to Loren S. Miller and
rejected by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on November 3,
1999 (CIEL 1999).
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tural knowledge and property4 of Indigenous societies.
This application is complicated by a lack of consistent
terminology across interested or affected parties, Indig-
enous and non-Indigenous alike. For example, what is it
that needs protecting and from whom? As Mann (1997:
1) notes, “No one definition [of indigenous knowledge]
has been universally endorsed or accepted by either Ab-
original or non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada. What is
clear, however, is that indigenous knowledge as a con-
cept concerns information, understanding, and knowl-
edge that reflects symbiotic relationships between in-
dividuals, communities, generations, the physical
environment and other living creatures, and the spiritual
relationships of a people.” Likewise, according to the
Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs (Hampton and
Henderson 2000:ii), “There is no universally accepted
definition for cultural property. . . . Most academic com-
mentators assert that Indigenous knowledge issues are
stretching the existing legal categories so that only a
fuzzy line exists between intellectual, spiritual and cul-
ture rights.” The foregoing largely concerns living peo-
ple, but what of deceased societies? Archaeological re-
search involving Indigenous societies tends to blur past
and present.
National and international laws protecting cultural
and intellectual property are often seen as inconsistent
with emerging views on what aspects of Indigenous cul-
tural knowledge and heritage require protection. Ac-
cording to Battiste and Henderson (2000:145), the prob-
lem involves “negotiating with the modern concept of
property” in that Eurocentric legal approaches “treat all
thought as a commodity in the artificial market”
whereas Indigenous societies tend to see property as “a
sacred ecological order” that should not be commodified.
They suggest further (p. 250) that intellectual property
laws have
problems dealing with forms of knowledge in the
area of high art or high technology (e.g., computer
software and biotechnology). The major push for
amendment of the law comes from the top, so that
areas such as computer technology or biogenetic en-
gineering are receiving a lot of attention, and the
law is gradually being altered to accommodate these
forms of knowledge. Culture and knowledge on the
“bottom”—where Indigenous knowledge is so often
situated—tend to be ignored.
The perceived inadequacy of applying existing laws to
the protection of Indigenous cultural knowledge and her-
itage has led to recommendations for the expansion of
legal definitions and protection mechanisms and calls
for alternative and complementary nonlegal ones. For
4. Bell and Patterson (1999:206) define “Aboriginal cultural prop-
erty” as “movable objects that have sacred, ceremonial, historical,
traditional, or other purposes integral to the culture of a First
Nations community and may be viewed as collective property of
an Aboriginal people” and continue: “Aboriginal perspectives on
identification of cultural property and persons with authority to
alienate or convey such property may vary in accordance with the
laws, traditions and property systems of the claimant group.”
example, Janke (1998:3) proposes the term “Indigenous
cultural and intellectual property rights” to refer to “In-
digenous people’s rights to their heritage,” wherein “her-
itage comprises all objects, sites and knowledge, the na-
ture or use of which has been transmitted or continues
to be transmitted from generation to generation, and
which is regarded as pertaining to a particular Indigenous
group or its territory.” Artifacts, archaeological sites, and
some types of information generated by archaeological
research clearly fit this definition. In fact, there is a no-
table similarity between a statement from Hampton and
Henderson’s discussion paper that “generally, cultural
property is anything exhibiting physical attributes as-
sumed to be the results of human activity” (2000:ii) and
definitions of an archaeological site as “any place where
objects, features, or ecofacts manufactured or modified
by human beings are found” (Fagan 1997:478) and “any
place where material evidence exists about the human
past” (Thomas 1998:95).
In this paper we explore the concept of Indigenous
cultural and intellectual property rights in an archaeo-
logical context. The central questions posed are: What
relevance do intellectual property rights have to archae-
ology? What forms do these rights take? How might fu-
ture claims to intellectual property affect archaeology?
We begin by describing the “products” of archaeological
research and explaining what they represent in a con-
temporary sociocultural context. We assess the level of
protection of these products provided by existing legis-
lation (specifically, cultural heritage acts) and the poten-
tial of current intellectual property protection mecha-
nisms to augment that protection. Our focus is on
knowledge and its physical manifestations (such as im-
ages and “art”) that are derived from or otherwise pertain
to the past.
We consider also whether and in what way our un-
derstanding of these emerging issues in archaeology can
be informed by trends in related disciplines such as an-
thropology and ethnobotany. One possibility is that In-
digenous peoples may seek control of the knowledge and
other products of archaeological research conducted in
their traditional lands—perhaps much as they have of
the results of ethnobotanical research on their traditional
knowledge and plant medicines (Bannister 2000, Ban-
nister and Barrett n.d., Brush and Strabinsky 1996,
Greaves 1994, Posey and Dutfield 1996). In our final sec-
tion we turn to this related academic field for insights
and comparative examples.
The scope of this paper ranges from local to interna-
tional. Our examples are drawn from Canada (particu-
larly British Columbia, where intellectual property
rights are an important topic in current treaty negotia-
tions), the United States, Australia, and elsewhere. The
implications for archaeology are of regional significance
and global interest.
Michael Brown’s (1998) article “Can Culture Be
Copyrighted?” provides an initial point of reference for
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our discussion.5 Copyright is one of several legal instru-
ments under statutory and common law that can be used
to enforce exclusive rights in the marketplace in crea-
tions that meet certain legal criteria (i.e., novelty and
material fixedness). In particular, copyright protects the
physical expression of ideas but not the ideas themselves
or any substantive or factual information. Ownership of
copyright is established by the author’s fixing the work
in a material form and is used to protect rights to novel
literary, artistic, dramatic, or musical works (as well as
computer software). Protection is for a limited term (e.g.,
in Canada, the life of the author plus 50 years).6 Rather
than suggesting that copyright is the only—or the most
appropriate—tool for protecting rights to intellectual
property in archaeology, our title questions the common
perception that this is the case. Other forms of intellec-
tual property protection that may be relevant to archae-
ology include patent, trademark, industrial design, and
trade secret.7 Arguably, some of these mechanisms al-
ready have approximations in Indigenous societies—for
example, family or clan ownership of songs, stories, or
motifs and possession by healers of specialized medicinal
knowledge that is not widely shared within the com-
munity. While ownership is not a Western8 concept,
these examples of Indigenous ownership are not given
legal status in most countries. It is important to distin-
guish between creations that are legally protectable un-
der current legislation and those that are not. Opportu-
nities or pressure (internal or external) to exploit
ownership rights and privileges for commercial purposes
present challenges to many Indigenous communities—
particularly elders, traditional healers, storytellers, and
other knowledge holders, who must often reconcile their
reservations about sharing cultural knowledge with the
wider society (thereby contributing to recognition and
potential commercial development, as well as misappro-
priation or misuse) with cultural beliefs and responsi-
bilities that embody sharing. Such challenges are com-
plicated by a widespread lack of understanding of what
can and cannot be legally protected. Archaeology will
not move beyond being a colonialist enterprise unless it
actively seeks to understand the underlying issues of
ownership and control of material and intellectual prop-
erty as related to cultural knowledge and heritage.
5. This theme is expanded upon in Brown’s book Who Owns Native
Culture? (2003), which is highly recommended as a comprehensive
review and discussion of many key issues.
6. Copyright Act. R.S., c. C-30, s. 1, Canada (http://laws.justice.
gc.ca/en/C-42/37844.html).
7. A patent is the right to exclude others for a defined period of
time (e.g., 20 years in Canada) from making, using, or selling an
invention that involves a new process, structure, or function. A
trademark is a word, symbol, picture, or group of these used to
distinguish the products or services of one individual, organization,
or company from those of another. An industrial design protects
the shape, pattern, or ornamentation of an industrially produced
object. A trade secret is practical knowledge that has commercial
value, provides a competitive advantage, and is not widely known
(Industry Canada 1995, Posey and Dutfield 1996, Stephenson 1999).
8. However limited the term is, we use “Western” here in its usual
colonial/post-colonial sense, as in the distinction between “the
West and the Rest” (Sahlins 1976).
Material property issues have certainly arisen in ar-
chaeology and will continue to frame key aspects of the
discipline. Especially contentious are the repatriation of
artifacts and reburial of human remains (e.g., Bray 2001,
Ferguson 1996, Mihesuah 2000, Rose, Green, and Green
1996). Issues related to intellectual property have been
less prominent,9 although trends in other fields suggest
that this will soon change. This is particularly true in
former colonized lands such as the Americas, Africa, and
Australia, where the archaeological record is mostly the
product of the ancestors of the present Indigenous pop-
ulation(s) and not that of the dominant culture. Archae-
ological research in the latter context is often seen as
appropriating Indigenous knowledge and rights or af-
fecting the sanctity of Indigenous beliefs—even when the
archaeologists involved believe that they are working to
the benefit of Indigenous communities.
The Products of Archaeological Research and
Their Protection
Archaeology is the study of human behavior and history
through material culture. It is concerned with what hap-
pened in the past, when it happened, and the processes
by which things changed and with the application of that
knowledge in the modern world. The archaeological rec-
ord is made up of both the individual and the cumulative
responses of humans to a suite of social, demographic,
cultural, and environmental opportunities over the
course of hours, years, or millennia. Archaeologists seek
to discover and explain this record and the cultural di-
versity it represents. The products of archaeological re-
search thus constitute scientific knowledge in the sense
of understanding the (past) world in new ways and at the
same time reflect the knowledge of Indigenous cultures.
Archaeology is also very much a contemporary socio-
cultural phenomenon that seeks to locate, create, clas-
sify, objectify, interpret, and present the past in ways that
reflect the particular views of its practitioners (see Pin-
sky and Wylie 1995).10 A key concern in contemporary
archaeology is the degree of participation and control
that Indigenous peoples have over the archaeological pro-
cess. In Canada, for example, control issues have cen-
tered on the limitation of access to sites in traditional
territories by way of a permit system (e.g., Denhez 2000).
Little attention has been paid to the products of archae-
ological research.
Aside from unearthed artifacts, what is it that archae-
ological research produces? In its many forms, archae-
9. Asch (1997) has examined the issue of ownership of cultural
property in an archaeological context but not that of intellectual
property rights per se.
10. We are very much aware that archaeology has frequently been
conducted in the context of an unequal power relationship in which
descendant communities have had little participation or say. This
has been true for Native Americans (e.g., Jemison 1997, Watkins
2000) and African-Americans (e.g., McDavid 2002, Singleton 1995).
The situation has changed notably in recent years (see e.g., the Code
of Ethics of the World Archaeological Congress).
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ology establishes chronology and precontact history (as
a supplement or a corollary to oral history) and illumi-
nates the processes by which things have changed. Spe-
cific products of archaeological research take the form
of site reports, site, artifact, and feature descriptions and
classifications, radiocarbon dates, and faunal remains,
among other materials. These are analyzed to produce
information on past technologies, dietary patterns, land-
use patterns, environmental settings, demographic
trends, social relationships, and other topics. Such stud-
ies may have a very short-term focus (e.g., reconstruction
of life at a particular time and place) or a very long-term
focus (e.g., shifts in dietary practices over millennia). A
central question raised by consideration of intellectual
property rights is whose property these products are and
how they are protected.
The lack of explicit consideration of these issues in
archaeology to date is partly the result of a societal per-
ception that the outcomes of archaeology have limited
practical application. While information of substantial
public value may be produced, archaeologists often have
difficulty communicating the contemporary relevance of
their field.11 Intellectual property rights issues may be
especially relevant in cases where the benefits of ar-
chaeological research are based directly upon Indigenous
cultural knowledge, such as the recognition and resto-
ration of raised-field farming (Erickson 1998) and chin-
ampas farming (Coe 1964) in Central and South America.
In such cases, the issues faced by archaeologists may
include (1) publication and ownership of copyright in
books, reports, and articles, (2) access to, public disclo-
sure of, and ownership of copyright in photographs of
artifacts, (3) fiduciary duties related to the secrecy of
sacred sites, which could also include copyright in maps,
(4) ownership, secrecy, and publication of traditional
knowledge that may result from archaeological research,
and (5) ownership of, copyright in, or trademarks related
to the artifacts, designs, or marks uncovered during ar-
chaeological research.
Archaeological sites represent the major physical man-
ifestation of cultural heritage for all human societies.
Despite broad concerns with preserving sites, buildings,
and objects of historical or cultural value, the degree of
preservation and protection varies from country to coun-
try and between different states, provinces, and territo-
ries. In the United States, for example, there is extensive
federal cultural heritage legislation, but archaeological
sites on private property are generally not protected (Pat-
terson 1999). The Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), which protects human
remains and “associated funerary objects, unassociated
11. For example, the long-term study and excavation of landfills in
the United States by William Rathje has demonstrated their inef-
fectiveness and contributed to their redesign (Rathje 1991, Rathje
and Murphy 1992). Carlson’s (1995) study of fish remains from ar-
chaeological sites in northeastern North America correlates the
substantial—and anomalous—historic salmon population with the
Little Ice Age cooling, thereby explaining why many expensive
salmon restoration projects may be unlikely to reach projected
goals.
funerary objects, sacred objects, and cultural patrimony,”
also excludes private property.12 In Canada, federal leg-
islation is very limited, with most heritage protection
being conducted at the provincial level. For example,
under the British Columbia Heritage Conservation Act
of 1996, all archaeological sites, whether on public or
private lands, are protected in principle. There is no pro-
vision for site identification surveys for all proposed de-
velopments, and therefore many sites are lost. Likewise,
artifacts are not covered and are openly bought, sold, or
traded at flea markets, auctions, and other venues.13
Whatever the level of legislated heritage protection, pro-
tection of archaeological materials in the United States
and Canada is based exclusively on the notion of physical
property (e.g., artifacts and sites).
General legislation protecting intellectual property is,
however, extensive in both countries. Thus, it is worth
exploring intellectual property rights from the perspec-
tive of determining whether any aspect of them offers
additional protection to archaeological resources and/or
provides new avenues that Indigenous peoples can pur-
sue to protect their cultural and intellectual property.
Certain products of archaeological fieldwork and re-
search are the result of the creative works of past Indig-
enous societies. Do they qualify as intellectual property
in a legal sense? Should the descendants14 of those re-
sponsible for the archaeological record have rights to that
record?
To date, applications of intellectual property rights in
fields closely related to archaeology such as anthropology
and ethnobotany have largely been concerned with pro-
tecting traditional knowledge and the related biological
resources (see Bannister 2000, Bannister and Barrett n.d.,
Brush and Stabinsky 1996, Greaves 1994, Posey and Dut-
field 1996). Is access to a site by archaeologists any dif-
ferent from access to traditional knowledge and plant
resources by ethnobotanists? From the point of view of
archaeology, traditional knowledge can be understood as
incorporating historic/modern land-use and health prac-
tices, oral and written histories, and expressions of
worldview. One reason that little attention has been paid
to archaeology may be that only limited material ex-
pressions of potential intellectual property are preserved
in the archaeological record and even that material tends
to be so old as to make issues of ownership moot from
12. “Cultural patrimony” is “an object having ongoing historical,
traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native American
group or culture” (NAGPRA 1990:sec. 2).
13. Export of artifacts out of the province is prohibited by the British
Columbia Heritage Conservation Act, while the export of many
materials out of Canada is regulated or prohibited by the Cultural
Property Export and Import Act.
14. We must be careful about making assumptions as to who the
descendants of a particular population are. In the Kennewick Man
case, there is little scientific evidence that the 9,000-year-old skel-
etal remains can be directly related to modern Umatilla and other
claimants. In the case of the Navajo claim to association with An-
asazi sites, archaeological data indicate that it is the Pueblo tribes
that are strongly linked to those sites, the Navajo having moved
into the Southwest only relatively recently.
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a legal perspective. For example, Brown (1998:196)
notes,15
The principal goal of intellectual property laws . . .
is to see that information enters the public domain
in a timely fashion while allowing creators, be they
individuals or corporate groups, to derive reasonable
financial and social benefits from their work. Once a
work enters the public domain, it loses most protec-
tions. I am free to publish Uncle Tom’s Cabin or to
manufacture steel paper clips without paying royal-
ties to their creators, whose limited monopoly has
expired. The same principle applies to prehistoric
petroglyphs or to the “Mona Lisa,” both of which
have become part of our common human heritage,
whatever their origins.
Brown’s comments raise two important points that
require further examination. First, many Indigenous
groups simply do not accept that their archaeological
past is first and foremost part of a shared human heri-
tage—at least at the expense of their claims to it. Second,
intellectual property protection has a limited time span
after which the intellectual property becomes part of the
public domain. If “time” is considered largely a Western
construct (Gould 1987, Zimmerman 1987), the phenom-
enon it represents may be perceived differently in Indig-
enous cultures. In Western society time is viewed as
linear and worldview is characterized by a series of clear
dichotomies: past/present, real/supernatural, male/fe-
male, good/evil, and so on. In many Indigenous societies,
however, not only is there greater flexibility in classi-
fying the world but the basic conception of time may be
significantly different (e.g., Williams and Mununggurr
1989).16 Where there is no cognitive separation between
past and present, ancestral spirits are part of the present.
This conceptual difference requires us to avoid an ex-
clusively Western orientation in interpreting prehistoric
lifeways (as in evaluating site significance and the im-
plications for cultural resource management practices),
and this presents a major challenge to the fundamentals
of intellectual property law. In other words, the petro-
glyphs that Brown refers to may be timeless. Thus, in-
tellectual property laws that are constrained by Western
conceptions of time may be severely limited in utility
and appropriateness to Indigenous cultures.
Given the products of archaeological research, what
are potential points of concern with regard to intellectual
property rights? If other academic disciplines are any in-
dication, the concerns of the descendants of the people
responsible for the archaeological record may include ap-
propriation, misrepresentation, or misuse of knowledge,
15. The “Mona Lisa,” however, is owned by the Louvre and may
not be entirely in the public domain in a copyright sense. The
museum controls access to it and access to quality reproductions.
Petroglyphs have been trademarked (as official marks) in British
Columbia and therefore are not necessarily part of our common
human heritage.
16. Morris (1984:11), for example, notes that “ancient peoples be-
lieved that time was cyclic in character,” ignoring the fact that
many contemporary Aboriginal peoples also believe this.
loss of control of knowledge, and loss of access to the
products of research or their benefits. Non-Indigenous
researchers,17 for their part, fear loss of control, censor-
ship, or restrictions on use of knowledge—concerns that
relate to suppression of academic freedom and restric-
tions on publication, which, in turn, may affect academic
credentials, promotion, and continued research funding.
The issues are not limited to efforts of Indigenous peo-
ples to control their own past but also surface in religious
contexts. In Israel, archaeology and related research have
been severely limited by objections of ultra-Orthodox
Jewish groups over the sanctity of human remains. As a
result of a 1994 ruling by the Israeli Attorney General,
all human remains must be “immediately handed over
to the ministry of religious affairs for reburial” (Balter
2000:35). This has effectively halted most physical an-
thropology, and it extends to remains not affiliated with
the modern Israeli population, including early human
remains.
The issue of censorship will likely be raised more fre-
quently as Indigenous peoples in many parts of the world
regain greater control over their affairs. Academics are
often complacent about their “freedom” until it is threat-
ened. With freedom, however, comes responsibility.
Most problems relating to publication of archaeological
data can likely be avoided with some conscientious fore-
thought and proactive effort. For example, where the po-
tential for conflict exists, researchers will do well to
work closely with community participants from the start
and make clear what the project goals and products will
be. Researchers should also be clear about how the prod-
ucts of their research may constitute intellectual prop-
erty and whose property this will be.
Claire Smith (1994:96) offers the following position:
My view is that Barunga people have the right to
censor any aspect of my research that they find dis-
tressing or offensive. However, in order to avoid ex-
tensive censoring of the research I designed its pa-
rameters in consultation with them. Having done
this, I do not believe that Barunga people have the
right to decide whether the research as a whole
should be published, unless we had negotiated this
provision prior to the research being undertaken. . . .
Nor do I agree with some Aboriginal people who
maintain that results of research should be owned
by indigenous people. . . . In my opinion the intel-
lectual property arising from the research belongs to
the researchers involved though they have an over-
riding responsibility not to offend the people with
whom they work.
The question raised is whether the intellectual value or
creative contribution of the cultural knowledge being
disclosed exceeds that of the research or transcription
17. Concerns faced by Indigenous researchers would presumably
include some elements from both of these points of view and be
further influenced by whether they were members of the com-
munities in which they were working. Such individuals may also
expose themselves to criticism for having “sold out.”
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process. This issue is at the heart of editorial control,
restrictions on publication, and claims to intellectual
property. Who owns the intellectual property arising
from the research is in some cases institution- or funder-
specific. The policies of most academic institutions may
be characterized generally as “institution as owner” or
“inventor as owner,” the former clearly limiting the dis-
cretionary power of an individual researcher on the mat-
ter (Bannister 2003).
The desire of many Indigenous peoples to control or
censor information about their past may have two trig-
gers. One is the largely political motivation to regain
control over their own affairs; the other is a response to
the unwillingness of some archaeologists to listen to
and/or integrate Indigenous perspectives and interpre-
tations into their own. As Whiteley (1997:203) notes,
“Archaeologists . . . have more often than not syste-
matically excluded the knowledge and interpretations of
living Pueblo descendants—as they have with non-West-
ern indigenous peoples worldwide. . . . The intellectual
grounds for exclusion, particularly in the now-old ‘new
archaeology,’ exalt cold ‘scientific analysis’ of mute ma-
terial remains over indigenous oral histories: Natives
need not apply.” Essentially, the validity of the power
inequities inherent in the conventional academic re-
search approach (i.e., the archaeologist as expert on In-
digenous culture) is in dispute. It is instructive to ex-
amine some commonalities between academic and
Indigenous communities in the general concerns noted
previously. The ultimate risk to both sides is loss of con-
trol of knowledge. An obvious tension between the dif-
ferent actors exists in terms of the importance, potential
utility, and meaning of knowledge. In archaeology at
least, this tension is better understood when knowledge
is seen as both part of cultural property and integral to
cultural identity. From this perspective, the appropria-
tion and commodification of knowledge acquire added
complexity, and control of knowledge becomes vital to
cultural integrity.
Archaeological Research Products as Cultural
and Intellectual Property
Every human society is the embodiment of a particular
system of knowledge. The cultural knowledge possessed
by contemporary Indigenous societies is part of a com-
pendium of wisdom that extends back through time, a
significant portion of which is represented in archaeo-
logical materials and information. This information not
only reflects what happened and when it happened in
the past but is symbolic of cultural identity and world-
view still important to many of the descendants of the
sites’ creators. Archaeological sites thus constitute not
only cultural property but intellectual creations, raising
questions of how archaeologically derived knowledge
contributes to cultural identity and what aspects of cul-
tural identity qualify as intellectual property. Here we
are referring not to archaeological approaches to cultural
identity (i.e., using archaeology to define ethnicity [e.g.,
Shennan 1989]) but rather to the appreciation of archae-
ological material as a component of cultural identity
(Jones 1997) that makes the products of archaeology po-
tential forms of intellectual property. Archaeological
sites and materials fit the above-mentioned definitions
of Indigenous cultural and intellectual property proposed
by Janke (1998) and Hampton and Henderson (2000) in
their contributions to cultural identity, worldview, cul-
tural continuity, and traditional ecological knowledge.
cultural identity
Archaeological artifacts and sites have long served as
symbols of national identity worldwide. Stonehenge is
not only one of the best-known archaeological sites in
the world but also strongly associated with British iden-
tity (see Golding 1989). When Rhodesia gained inde-
pendence in 1980 and became Zimbabwe, it took its new
name from an archaeological site and chose as its na-
tional symbol a carved soapstone bird from that site. In
many parts of the world, Aboriginal communities relo-
cated by government mandate, epidemics, or other fac-
tors have retained a strong association with their former
homes, whether through occasional visits or through oral
histories (e.g., Kritsch and Andre 1997, Myers 1986). Ar-
tifacts and heirlooms also play a vital role in the identity
of Indigenous peoples, serving as a link both to past gen-
erations and to the systems of knowledge that sustained
them. This may help to explain the widespread use of,
for example, arrowheads—objects that have likely not
been in use for a century or more—in the contemporary
logos of many Aboriginal groups in North America.
Aboriginal peoples may choose to represent them-
selves or seek confirmation of their cultural identity by
continuing to use (or, in some cases, adopting) precontact
objects or traditions (e.g., Merrill, Ladd, and Ferguson
1992). These may include architecture, traditional foods
and cooking practices, and rock art imagery. In the In-
terior Plateau of British Columbia, the image of the
semisubterranean pit house (fig. 1) is widely used by the
Secwepemc (or Shuswap) people on letterhead, signage
(fig. 2), sweatshirts, and promotional items. Full-scale
reconstructions of pit houses are found in Aboriginal her-
itage parks and communities; some individuals have
even built and seasonally use their own pit houses. Un-
derground pit-cooking (a practice well-documented in
the archaeological record) continues, although only in-
frequently, and pit-cooked food is prized (Peacock 1998).
Pictographs are also widely viewed by Secwepemc and
other Plateau peoples as an important part of their her-
itage (e.g., York, Daly, and Arnett 1993), although no new
ones have been painted for many generations. Among
other things, pictographs provide an expression of world-
view and clear indications of a distinctive Aboriginal
presence in the landscape.
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Fig. 1. Reconstructed pit house, Secwepemc Museum
and Heritage Park, Kamloops, B.C. (photo G.
Nicholas).
Fig. 2. Example of stylized pit house used as the logo
of the Secwepemc Museum, Kamloops, B.C. (photo G.
Nicholas).
worldview
Certain types of archaeological sites and artifacts, such
as pictographs, petroglyphs, medicine wheels, vision
quest sites, and burial sites, have long been associated
with the worldviews of Indigenous peoples. While few
of these are still in use today, those that are reflect con-
tinued use since precontact times; offerings are left at
sacred places today much as they have been for possibly
millennia (e.g., Andrews and Zoe 1997). In Australia, the
National Aboriginal Sites Authorities Committee dis-
tinguishes two types of Aboriginal sites: (1) archaeolog-
ical sites, whose significance is defined “on the basis of
scientific enquiry and general cultural and historical val-
ues,” and (2) “sites which are the tangible embodiment
of the sacred and secular traditions of the Aboriginal
peoples of Australia.” It is noted that the latter sites may
include the former and that the “relative significance of
these sites may only be determined by the Aboriginal
custodians” (NASAC 1991, cited in Ritchie 1994:233).
The role of these types of sites is not necessarily static
but reinterpreted or even augmented to meet current
needs. Dreamtime sites are places in the landscape where
ancestral beings went about creating the land and all it
contained, including themselves (see Stanner 1998). To
Aboriginal Australians, the Dreaming is a timeless phe-
nomenon relayed through oral traditions linked to specific
places and objects. While most of these tell how things
came into being, they also reflect contemporary issues.
As noted by Chatwin (1987:12), almost anything “can
have a Dreaming. A virus can be a Dreaming. You can
have a chickenpox Dreaming, a rain Dreaming, a desert-
orange Dreaming, a lice Dreaming. In the Kimberleys
they’ve now got a money Dreaming.” Contemporary in-
fluences on traditions are also found in North America.
Offerings left at sacred places often include tobacco, peb-
bles, and food, as well as coins and other “modern” items.
Such versatility is also seen in rock art, which may include
both an objective record of life in the past (e.g., animals
seen) and a subjective one (e.g., personal visions, dreams,
magic). These images may be interpreted differently today
from when they were created.18 In some places, the tra-
dition continues of repainting or even painting over old
images (e.g., Chaloupka 1986).
Mortuary practices and the treatment of human re-
mains are also expressions of worldview, and the reburial
issue goes to the core of worldview and cultural identity
in indigenous societies everywhere (e.g., Bray 2001, Car-
michael et al. 1994, Davidson, Lovell-Jones, and Bancroft
1995, Zimmerman 1997). Cemeteries have long been im-
portant places in the cultural landscape and served as
territorial markers. Some cemeteries have been in use
for thousands of years (O’Neill 1994). Such locations are
of importance to the associated contemporary Indige-
nous communities and may also play a significant role
in land claims and political movements.
cultural continuity
Cultural continuity may be reflected in the occupation
of the same lands for millennia, in the retention of the
technologies used in the past to produce the same house-
hold goods (e.g., ceramics in the American Southwest),
and in other ways (e.g., Jones 1997). Archaeological sites
serve as important personal and societal touchstones
(i.e., as links between past and present) that reaffirm ba-
sic values and provide a sense of place. This is indicated
by Chase’s (1989:17) observations on the significance of
18. This is likely the case with the Nlaka’pamux elder Annie York’s
interpretation of pictographs in her band territory in the Interior
Plateau of British Columbia (York, Daly, and Arnett 1993). The
degree to which her interpretations of imagery match those of its
creators hundreds or thousands of years ago is debatable (Nicholas
2001).
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precontact archaeological sites for North Queensland
Aboriginal people in Australia. In cases where the co-
lonial experience and a century or more of acculturation
have dramatically changed the lives of Aboriginal peo-
ples, there often remain core cultural values that indicate
the persistence of traditional beliefs and worldview.
These may take the form, for example, of a strong em-
phasis on family values and respect for community
elders.
The strong connection between cultural continuity
and Indigenous claims to land and cultural or archaeo-
logical materials has significant implications for the rec-
ognition of ownership in matters of repatriation and re-
burial. However, the continuity may sometimes be more
apparent than real; as a result of population movements
in the distant past or historic federal tribal relocation
and the often capricious nature of tribal boundary rec-
ognition, one group may occupy a territory that contains
the archaeological record of another. Even in central Aus-
tralia, where until recently the effects of colonialism
were limited, the degree of relatedness between the Ab-
original Australian groups mapped by Tindale (1974) and
their late Pleistocene predecessors in the area merits
examination.
Where cultural discontinuities are recognized in the
archaeological record, residents of the area may deal with
this information in different ways. For example, the
group may lack any concrete knowledge of earlier resi-
dents and accept the entirety of the local archaeological
record as its own; some Secwepemc people insist that
their ancestors always lived in pit houses and harvested
salmon when the archaeological record suggests that
these are later Holocene developments (Nicholas 2003).
Alternatively, the newcomers may recognize the legacy
of an earlier occupation and integrate knowledge of an-
cient unrelated beings into their histories and world-
views as Hamann (2002) has documented for Meso-
america. Finally, the group may consciously co-opt the
archaeological record for cultural or political reasons, as
is the case with current Navajo claims to Anasazi ar-
chaeological sites.
traditional ecological knowledge
“Traditional ecological knowledge” has been described
as an Indigenous system of knowledge that is based on
observation, testing, and replicated results and therefore
directly comparable with “science.” Berkes (1993:3) de-
fines the term as “a cumulative body of knowledge and
beliefs, handed down through generations by cultural
transmission, about the relationship of living beings (in-
cluding humans) with one another and with their en-
vironment. [It] is an attribute of societies with historical
continuity in resource use practices; by and large, these
are non-industrial or less technologically advanced so-
cieties, many of them Indigenous or tribal.” Traditional
systems of knowledge have become an important subject
of intellectual property rights (e.g., Simpson 1999) and
are increasingly recognized by both Indigenous and non-
Indigenous people as a manifestation of the acquired
knowledge of particular Indigenous societies. This body
of knowledge includes not only the intellectual tradition
itself (i.e., the information preserved and transmitted)
but also the traditional use sites that are the geographic
expression of that knowledge.
Archaeological sites by any definition are traditional
use sites, and therefore the knowledge represented at
these sites is worth considering in the context of cultural
and intellectual property. Various types of sites (e.g., fish
weirs) represent the operation or practice of past land-
use and resource-harvesting practices that, in turn, are
the embodiment of traditional ecological knowledge,
while those of a particular region collectively reflect
compositional and distributional changes that occurred
over millennia as past occupants responded to shifts in
the natural and social environment. Traditional ecolog-
ical knowledge is also frequently used by archaeologists
to locate archaeological sites (e.g., Greer 1997). Site in-
formation is typically obtained through interviews with
elders and community members or from published
ethnographies.
Should intellectual components of the archaeological
record such as these be protected as proprietary? If so,
by whom? No explicit protection exists under any pro-
vincial or state heritage protection mechanisms in Can-
ada or the United States. Most archaeologists, in fact,
may not recognize an intellectual component at all.
However, the situation is likely very different for those
with a vested interest in their own heritage sites. In Aus-
tralia, for example, Aboriginal peoples have expressed
concern that “the focus of cultural heritage laws is on
tangible cultural heritage, such as specific areas, objects,
and sites. The intangible aspects of a significant site,
such as its associated stories, songs, and dreaming tracks,
are not protected” (Janke 1998:xxiv; also Roberts 2003).
Even if an intellectual component is recognized, an ar-
gument may be made that the great age of most archae-
ological sites puts this information in the realm of shared
heritage, thus making its exploitation legally acceptable.
In the following section we return to the two-sided issue
of control of knowledge in archaeology and evaluate
threats to Indigenous cultural and intellectual property
rights through appropriation and commodification—tak-
ing and affixing a price to what many would consider
inalienable and priceless.
Appropriation and Commodification of the
Past
Appropriation and commodification of cultural knowl-
edge and property affect the cultural identity and integ-
rity of contemporary Indigenous societies. Should cul-
tural knowledge and property be protected from such
exploitation? If so, should protection be from outside
interests only or from all users, including Indigenous
peoples themselves? Mutability (distortions) and trans-
ferability (easy dissemination) may be reasons to explore
the usefulness of intellectual property mechanisms for
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protecting some aspects of cultural knowledge and prop-
erty from exploitation. But what if Indigenous groups
want to exploit their own past for commercial gain?19
Should intellectual property laws be used discriminately
to protect the past—to support Indigenous rights? We do
not address these important and complicated questions
here. Rather, our aim is to raise issues and outline po-
tential consequences of appropriation and commodifi-
cation of artifacts and information with the intention of
informing and stimulating discussion in this growing
area of concern.
artifacts
The collection of antiquities extends back in time for
thousands of years (Trigger 1989:27–72). Today, however,
the acquisition of antiquities, often by illegal or uneth-
ical means, is occurring at unprecedented rates to satisfy
the growing interest of collectors and museums in his-
toric or prehistoric items that are prized for their age,
rarity, exoticness, or “Aboriginalness.” Sometimes In-
digenous peoples themselves contribute to the appropri-
ation and commodification of artifacts; the often im-
poverished Indigenous Central and South Americans
known as huaqueros loot tombs and sell the artifacts to
support their families: “Many of Latin America’s indig-
enous peoples see themselves as the legitimate heirs to
both seeds and artifacts, which are conceived of as an-
cestor’s gifts, given to humanity by real or mythological
patrons to be harvested, or excavated, as it were, by later
generations” (Matsuda 1998:88). “Subsistence digging”
also occurs in North America (Hollowell 2003, Staley
1993), and its profits may provide the means of acquiring
the knowledge or skills that allow Aboriginal people to
improve their circumstances. Zimmer (2003:306–7), for
example, reports: “Once a young [Native] woman
brought a newly-found artifact to show me, an ivory an-
imal worth many thousands of dollars on the market. ‘I
know I shouldn’t sell this, Julie,’ she said, ‘but it will
help pay for my college education.’ ” Subsistence digging
is not limited to Aboriginal peoples, as is evidenced by
the tombaroli of Italy and pothunters in the United
States, and in some cases Indigenous subsistence diggers
do not consider the archaeological remains part of their
culture.
The appropriation and commodification of artifacts
may also take less obvious forms. For example, repro-
ductions of artifacts in various media and the public dis-
semination of information, objects, and images derived
from the archaeological record are often found among
the technologically assisted and mass-produced products
introduced into modern society. These include images
of artifacts and sites, sometimes including those cher-
ished by or sacred to past or present Indigenous peoples,
19. This is but one facet of a larger and more difficult question: If
a group “owns” or controls its cultural heritage, should it not have
the freedom to do what it wishes with it? Many who agree in
principle with this reasoning are dismayed when it is put into prac-
tice (for example, when repatriated human remains are reburied).
that appear on postcards, T-shirts, and billboards and in
magazine advertisements, books, and films. For example,
Sherwin-Williams uses images of the Upper Paleolithic
Lascaux Cave paintings to sell house paint, and AT&T
digitally inserts its logo into Egyptian tomb carvings.
Through these advertisements, the past is appropriated
and commodified in the sense that it is marketed in ways
parallel to other, original or more contemporary ideas
and resources.
Appropriation and commodification are accompanied
by the objectification of the past—a focus on artifacts
rather than on the people behind them. In a book on the
pictographs of British Columbia, Corner (1968:1) states
that “the freedom to wander unrestricted through the
rugged and beautiful Kootenay country made me appre-
ciate the feelings of the Indians, and created an intense
interest in their life and culture.” He goes on to report
that “a diligent search of the recorded data on picto-
graphs in North America failed to reveal a simple key
that would unlock the mystery of what these fascinating
paintings really mean,”20 overlooking the possibility that
contemporary Aboriginal peoples could have assisted
him in this effort.
Although anthropologists and archaeologists ought to
be more sensitive than others to issues of cultural ap-
propriation and commodification, they, too, sometimes
assume that ancient objects become divorced from con-
temporary cultural impacts when they enter the public
domain. When a seated-figurine bowl was illustrated on
the program cover of the 1992 Northwest Anthropology
Conference, several First Nations individuals in atten-
dance considered this use inappropriate because such
bowls still have spiritual value. A similar bowl was il-
lustrated by Winter and Henry (1997) but only with the
permission of the Saanich Native Heritage Society. Per-
haps the most common example of such appropriation
is the use of artifacts and rock art imagery as part of the
cover designs of books and journals.21 If permission to
reproduce such artifacts is sought, it is generally from
the museum that today curates or owns them.
In marketing the past, the accomplishments of earlier
societies are not only removed from their original phys-
ical and cultural context but sometimes otherwise al-
tered. The transformation of the unique into the com-
monplace radically changes the value of things. For
centuries, the great Renaissance frescoes of Europe could
be viewed only from inside the buildings in which they
were painted. Addressing this point, John Berger (1977:
19) writes: “Originally paintings were an integral part of
the building for which they were designed. . . . The
uniqueness of every painting was once part of the
uniqueness of the place where it resided. . . . When the
20. While many Aboriginal people had commented on the appro-
priateness of Corner’s book, the recent publication of another book
on British Columbia rock art (Nankivell and Wyse 2003), this one
including GPS locations, has raised the ire of some First Nations.
21. Including American Antiquity, Australian Archaeology, the
Canadian Journal of Archaeology, Latin American Antiquity, the
Mid-Continental Journal of Archaeology, and Northeast Anthro-
pology.
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camera reproduces a painting, it destroys the uniqueness
of its image. Or, more exactly, its meaning multiplies
and fragments into many meanings.” Berger is writing
here of Western art, but his comments pertain also to
Indigenous representations, both historic and prehis-
toric. The same is true of the Upper Paleolithic cave
paintings of Lascaux and of Native American rock art,
all of which were previously part of fixed landscapes.
Regardless of the original intention of their creators,
the appreciation of these representations is very different
when they are widely disseminated—and perhaps even
altered—through a variety of media. The following an-
ecdote (from Nicholas) illustrates how easy it is to alter
an idea expressed in tangible form, how little control we
have over dissemination of the original idea, and how
difficult it is to make proprietorial claims of an intel-
lectual nature in various high-tech media:
About ten years ago I was preparing a lecture on
hunter-gatherer economy. I was thinking about “ac-
cess to the means of production” and other ideas in-
fluenced by the work of Karl Marx while making
overhead transparencies of !Kung hunters. The next
thing I knew, the old boy’s head had been pasted
onto a hunter’s body and then onto an Upper Paleo-
lithic “Venus” figurine. Soon after, I sent copies of
this inspired artwork to several colleagues, including
Martin Wobst of the University of Massachu-
setts–Amherst, where I had completed my Ph.D.
Last year I learned from Wobst that my Venus/Marx
figure had appeared on a T-shirt prepared for the
25th anniversary of the department. I was amused
and honored that this late-night whimsy had its 15
minutes of fame. However, in thinking about IPR is-
sues, I began to wonder where the design on this
shirt might ultimately end up. Perhaps an enterpris-
ing entrepreneur, seeing someone wearing it, will
decide to create a series of T-shirts featuring famous
people on Venus-figurine bodies.
The unauthorized appropriation of Aboriginally pro-
duced images, whether ancient or modern, has been a
topic of discussion in Australia for some time (see John-
son 1996). Much attention has been given to the theft
of Aboriginal design, particularly those created by con-
temporary Aboriginal artists. Still another dimension of
this relates to the theft of intellectual property through
the appropriation of Aboriginal art. Brown (1998:219)
notes that in a recent legal case in Darwin the plaintiffs
were “asking the federal court to recognize the clan’s
economic and moral rights in the artist’s graphic designs,
rights tied to the clan’s territory and ritual knowledge.”
At least some pictographs and petroglyphs in North
America represent graphic designs tied to traditional ter-
ritories and the ritual knowledge of past people whose
descendants may still occupy that territory. These de-
signs may subsequently appear in books and other me-
dia,22 seldom with attribution to the traditional peoples
concerned.
Even when there is approval by Aboriginal persons for
the publication of such images or interpretations thereof,
is the approval at the level of family, community, tribe,
or nation? In some cases it may be Aboriginal peoples
themselves that commodify the past. For example, the
native people of St. Lawrence Island, Alaska, have been
digging and selling artifacts from their ancestral sites for
many years (see Hollowell 2003, Hollowell-Zimmer
2001, Staley 1993, Zimmer 2003). However, as Zimmer
(2003:307) notes, “Perhaps a Euro-American notion in
which objects of material culture are venerated as ‘her-
itage’ is somewhat foreign to a people whose heritage is
performed and experienced in daily practices like speak-
ing their own language, whaling, eating Native foods,
and drum-dancing sans tourists.”
Appropriation of the North American archaeological
record has been facilitated by Indigenous and non-Indig-
enous parties alike. One example involves the Zia Pueblo
sun symbol. Zia Pueblo has demanded $73 million from
the state of New Mexico for the use of its zia sun symbol
on the state flag. The symbol, adopted by the state in
1925, had been developed by Harry Mera, a physician
and anthropologist at the Santa Fe Museum of Anthro-
pology, on the basis of a pot on display in the museum
that had been made by an anonymous Zia potter in the
late 1800s (Healy 2003). (The symbol had likely appeared
much earlier.) Another example concerns the cancella-
tion of a mural of images from Pottery Mound ruin com-
missioned for the new archaeology building at the Uni-
versity of New Mexico in deference to objections raised
by Acoma Pueblo. Pottery Mound is an 800-year-old site
near Albuquerque that was excavated in the 1950s and
1960s. The Acoma admit that their ancestors had noth-
ing to do with the artwork at the site. A statement by
the muralist, Tom Baker, raises an important point be-
yond the issue of political correctness: “Public Mound
images were excavated by a taxpayer-supported institu-
tion on public land, and thus are public property” (Duin
2003).
information
What has occurred with material property is also occur-
ring with the know-how of Indigenous peoples. Knowl-
edge that was once restricted to specific cultural systems
has now been made widely available, seldom because of
decisions of the communities themselves. Immense pub-
lic interest in things Aboriginal has for centuries
prompted collection, study, and even imitation of Native
curios and lifeways. This interest is increasingly spe-
cialized through fields like anthropology, which aims to
understand the totality of humankind through detailed
22. The cover of Australian Archaeology shows two stylized human
figures that are based on but not direct copies of rock art images.
Amy Roberts (personal communication, 2001) notes that Aboriginal
people have complained but thinks that this “has to do with the
figures’ being naked.” In 2000, the Australian Archaeological As-
sociation membership voted to keep the design.
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studies of selected societies, often in collaboration with
representatives of those societies. In some cases infor-
mation recorded by anthropologists has been of immense
value to community members decades later; that col-
lected and published by Franz Boas (1897, 1969 [1930])
has aided the Kwakiutl of British Columbia in restoring
aspects of their ceremonies that had been outlawed in
1885 (Holm 1990). Until the Indian Act was revised in
1951, it was illegal to hold certain ceremonies; individ-
uals or communities who persisted were often jailed and
their masks, regalia, and other items confiscated.23 For
the almost 70 years in which they were banned, pot-
latches and Winter Dances continued secretly, but many
of their components were changed or lost in the process.
The detailed information collected by Boas and his as-
sistant George Hunt has thus become a vital source for
those interested in restoring the ceremonies to their orig-
inal form. Intellectual aspects of cultural property and
cultural identity have been appropriated and sometimes
commodified in various ways, including traditional use
studies, use of human remains, cultural reconstructions
of life (i.e., cultural tourism/living museums), and ap-
plications of archaeological research results to modern
problems.
Traditional use studies. In British Columbia between
1995 and 2000, provincially funded “traditional use stud-
ies” provided Aboriginal communities with the “oppor-
tunity” to identify and map the cultural resources in
their territories systematically.24 Through these studies,
site-specific biological and cultural information on tra-
ditional activities was compiled by the participating
community and/or hired consultants. As part of the as-
sociated “sharing agreement,” the resulting data were
submitted to the Provincial Heritage Registered Data-
base for use in the government’s natural-resource man-
agement decisions. Information-sharing agreements
were established through a memorandum of understand-
ing between the province and the Aboriginal community
as part of the final phase of the study (i.e., after the data
had been compiled), but an interim sharing agreement
(signed by all parties prior to the initial phase of the
project) was required for final project funding. Sharing
agreements addressed the storage and distribution of in-
ventory data, confidentiality and security, and continued
reporting and management of information (Aboriginal
Affairs Branch, Ministry of Forests, TUS Program 1996,
cited in Markey 2001:71). Issues of data ownership and
intellectual property rights were not specifically ad-
23. Many of these materials became part of the collections of the
National Museum of Man and the Royal Ontario Museum, among
others (Lohnse and Sundt 1990:92).
24. These land-use and occupancy studies (cancelled in 2002) were
a product of British Columbia government policy responses to legal
obligations in land-use management as defined by the Court of
Appeal in Delgamuukw v The Queen (1993) (Culhane 1998). The
goal of the program was “to inventory TUS data to provide the
province and industry with the tools to facilitate meaningful con-
sultation with participating First Nations in land use planning” as
well as to “[assist] First Nations participating in the treaty process,
[and develop] cultural education and capacity” (http://www.for.gov.
bc.ca/aab/int_msrs/pim_tus.htm).
dressed—a serious omission that was recognized by
many First Nations and made them unwilling to partic-
ipate because of uncertainty about the future use of the
data. In her critical analysis of the traditional use study
as a model for data gathering and interpretation of tra-
ditional ecological knowledge in British Columbia, Mar-
key (2001:14) concludes that such studies “continue to
produce inventory-based data, reflecting minimal con-
cern for Aboriginal perspectives and knowledge by taking
cultural information out of context.”
Appropriation of human remains. The Kennewick
Man controversy (Chatters 2000, Preston 1997) has be-
come a landmark case on the disposition of prehistoric
human remains. Aboriginal groups in the Northwest
have argued in the courts since 1996 that the remains
of this 9,000-year-old individual should be repatriated
and reburied under the provisions of the NAGPRA,
which states that Aboriginal human remains must be
turned over to the representative Aboriginal group where
affinity can be determined. A group of archaeologists has
countered that because of their great age these remains
cannot be related to the Aboriginal groups laying claim
to them and has sued the U.S. government for the right
to study them (Bonnichsen v United States, 969 F Supp
628 [1997])25—essentially asserting themselves as the
rightful owners or stewards of the information contained
in the skeletal remains. In September 2000 a federal judge
ruled that the remains were to be turned over to the tribal
claimants. The case was subsequently appealed. In Au-
gust 2002 U.S. Magistrate John Jelderks ruled that the
skeletal remains could be studied by the archaeologists.
The ultimate fate of the remains and the information
they embody is uncertain; an appeal of the decision is
planned by the tribal claimants.26 This case has obvious
implications for the appropriation of material property
and, pending the results of legal decisions on ancestry
and custodianship, may raise issues of intellectual prop-
erty in relation to the appropriation of Indigenous world-
view.
Reconstruction of Indigenous lifeways. Cultural tour-
ism has become a significant industry worldwide, and
living museums and theme parks are widespread. Many
of these include reenactments of life in the past utilizing
speech and people in period clothing to represent both
the colonizers and the colonized. The “best” of these
include or are led by bearers of the culture involved,27
25. D. Ore (1997), cited in the final court brief (http://www.
kennwick-man.com/documents/doi.html).
26. Non-Aboriginal organizations have also made claims, including
the Asatru Folk Assembly, which insists that the remains are those
of an ancient European: “the Asatru Folk Assembly . . . practices
an ancient religion known as Asatru, with roots in northern Europe.
. . . Asatru emphasizes the spiritual importance of ancestral bonds.
Since Kennewick Man may well be related to modern-day people
of European descent, the AFA filed suit in 1996 in federal court to
prevent the U.S. government from giving the skeleton to local In-
dian tribes, and to ensure the remains were studied and results
released to the public” (http://www.runestone.org/kmfact.html).
27. For example, those of African-American slaves at Colonial Wil-
liamsburg (Virginia) offered through an interpretive program called
“The Other Half Tour.”
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Fig. 3. Campfire, from the series Karl May Festival, by Andrea Robbins and Max Becher 1997–98 (reproduced
by permission of the photographers and courtesy of Sonnabend Gallery, New York).
but some of them blatantly exploit and stereotype In-
digenous peoples. Living museums allow visitors to take
home the experience of an “authentic” (and safe) en-
counter with the Other. There is also today a prolifera-
tion of Aboriginal heritage parks, tours, workshops, and
“experiences” that are Aboriginally conceived, devel-
oped, and run.28 The way in which Aboriginal commu-
nities choose to present themselves is critical to whether
the experience is appreciated by visitors as one of cul-
tural education and sharing or criticized as cultural
“prostitution.”
Other examples are worth noting. The German Indian
clubs (Calloway, Gmunden, and Zantop 2002, Robbins
and Becher 1997–98) consist of individuals who “play
Indian” at several removes from the Native Americans
they emulate (fig. 3). Going a step farther, the Smokis of
the American Southwest have actually appropriated and
violated Hopi ceremonies. Founded in 1921 by white
businessmen, the Smokis put on public performances
28. For example, Xa`:ytem (Hatzic Rock) and Tla-o-qui-aht cultural
tours by Tla-ook Adventures in British Columbia and the co-man-
aged Kakadu National Park in Australia.
that are essentially parodies of the Hopi Snake Dance
(Whitely 1997:178). Added to threats to the sanctity of,
loss of access to, or destruction of sacred places (e.g., Mt.
Graham, Arizona) and the commodification of religious
objects, symbolism, and artifacts (Whiteley 1997; Pearl-
stone 2000, 2001), these activities leave little of the cul-
tural knowledge and property of Southwestern Indige-
nous peoples unscathed.
Applications of archaeological research. Two types of
archaeologically derived information have particular rel-
evance in the modern world.29 The first is information
derived from studies of long-term shifts in subsistence
practices or settlement patterns, which can be used to
evaluate the potential impact of climate change on mod-
ern populations. The second is information on prehis-
toric technology. Both types may be appropriated and
commodified.
One example of the development of new ideas through
archaeologically obtained knowledge of prehistoric tech-
29. Archaeological information is also relevant to other realms,
such as education.
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nology is the use of obsidian blades as surgical scalpels.
Obsidian was widely utilized for stone blade production
in many parts of the world. Aware that such blades had
an edge up to 1,000 times sharper than surgical steel,
Payson Sheets (1989) developed obsidian scalpels for use
in eye surgery, where the shaper edge promotes faster
healing and reduces scarring. Even though stone blade
production was practiced by virtually all past human
societies, this technology was potentially patentable be-
cause it represented a new use.30 Other modern flint-
knappers had observed how quickly obsidian cuts healed,
but Sheets was the first to capitalize on it. Another ex-
ample is the reintroduction of raised-field farming tech-
niques by Clark Erickson and his colleagues as a means
of assisting native communities to improve their agri-
cultural yields. There is extensive archaeological evi-
dence of raised fields throughout Central and South
America (Parsons and Denevan 1967), but this technol-
ogy appears to have fallen out of use until it was pro-
moted by Erickson and his colleagues (Erickson 1998).
This is not the case with the chinampas, a type of raised-
field farming constructed in swamps (Coe 1964), that
were the economic basis of the Aztec economy in Mexico
and of other societies in Central and South America and
have continued to be used to the present and introduced
into new areas. Does the reintroduction of forgotten
raised-field farming represent intellectual property? If so,
for whom—the archaeologists or the descendants of the
people who developed the technology in the first place?
Erickson’s (2000) more recent work on precontact arti-
ficial fisheries in the Bolivian Amazon suggests yet an-
other area of potentially commercially valuable Indige-
nous knowledge.
So far we have explored the notion that some products
of archaeological research represent cultural and intel-
lectual property according to Janke’s (1998) definition
and outlined some of the ways in which archaeologically
derived knowledge has been appropriated or commodi-
fied. We next focus on the means by which Indigenous
peoples are seeking (or may seek in future) to regain con-
trol over this knowledge through existing legal rights,
including intellectual property ownership mechanisms.
Who Owns the Future?
“Everyone now speaks of their culture,” says Sahlins
(1999:x), “precisely in the context of national or inter-
national threats to its existence. This does not mean a
simple and nostalgic desire for teepees and tomahawks
or some such fetishized repositories of a pristine identity.
A ‘naı¨ve attempt to hold peoples hostage to their own
histories,’ such a supposition, Terence Turner remarks,
would thereby deprive them of history. What the self-
30. On the basis of a search of the U.S. Patent Office database (http:
//www.uspto.gov/patft/) and personal communication with a rep-
resentative of Fine Science Tools Inc., a Vancouver-based company
that currently sells “Stone Age scalpels” made from obsidian (http:
//finescience.com/fst/ScalpelsKnives/10110-01.html), we conclude
that obsidian scalpels were not patented.
consciousness of ‘culture’ does signify is the demand of
the peoples for their own space within the world cultural
order.” A strong association between cultural knowledge
and cultural identity is reflected not only in a society’s
material culture (e.g., the pit house in Interior British
Columbia) but in the intellectual aspects of cultural
traditions. Language, for example, is a very important
contributor to Indigenous cultural identity (see Maffi
2000). Given the strength of this association, it is clear
why control of knowledge is at the heart of the issue—
not simply for economic reasons but because control is
integral to the definition or restoration of cultural iden-
tity for present and future Indigenous societies.
It can be argued that whoever owns (or controls records
of) the past also owns or otherwise shapes the future of
that past. Archaeologists have, to date, controlled the
dissemination of information derived from the archae-
ological record through publication practices, restriction
of access to site locations, and other means. While this
management of knowledge has done much to help pre-
serve archaeological resources, it has had several draw-
backs. For one, much information has been kept from
Indigenous communities, often inadvertently. Since ar-
chaeologists are in the position to choose what they will
or will not publish, information potentially useful to In-
digenous peoples may simply not be available because it
fell outside of the interests of the investigator and was
not pursued. Access to knowledge is obviously the first
of several key steps in establishing control of it. Yet pub-
lication itself is a double-edged sword in terms of sharing
research findings versus protecting knowledge from
third-party exploitation (see Bannister 2000; Bannister
and Barrett 2001, n.d.; Laird et al. 2002). Beyond simply
relying on heritage protection legislation, is it possible
to increase Indigenous control of cultural knowledge and
property through existing intellectual property laws and
complementary nonlegal tools? If so, what are the im-
plications for future archaeological research? In this final
section, we explore several current examples that may
begin to elucidate answers to these complex questions.
control through contracts and local
protocols for research
Examples of Indigenous groups’ seeking to control access
to and/or use of their past are definitely on the rise.
Brown (1998:194) cites a 1994 letter to several museums
from the chair of the Hopi Tribe that “states the tribe’s
interest in all published or unpublished field data relating
to the Hopi, including notes, drawings, and photographs,
particularly those dealing with religious matters.” He
notes also that
the Hopi initiative was soon followed by a declara-
tion issued by a consortium of Apache tribes de-
manding exclusive decision-making power and con-
trol over Apache “cultural property,” here defined as
“all images, text, ceremonies, music, songs, stories,
symbols, beliefs, customs, ideas and other physical
and spiritual objects and concepts” relating to the
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Apache, including any representations of Apache
culture offered by Apache or non-Apache people (In-
ter-Apache Summit on Repatriation 1995:3).
An important question to consider is to what degree ar-
chaeological research products might be included here.
Local Indigenous protocols are increasingly being used
as the basis for research contracts or agreements between
the communities and outside researchers. Protocols have
been developed by many Aboriginal groups in British
Columbia, and some require a permit in lieu of one is-
sued by the B.C. Heritage Branch under the Heritage
Conservation Act. The Sto:lo Nation, for example,
states: “We hereby declare that all artifacts recovered
from our traditional campsites, ceremonial sites, vil-
lages, burial grounds and archaeological sites are the
rightful property of the Sto:lo people” (quoted in Mohs
1987:169). The protocol of the Cultural Resources Man-
agement Department (CRMD) of the Kamloops Band,
Secwepemc Nation, contains even more inclusive terms
and provisions for an archaeological permitting system,
stating that “all data, maps, journals, and photographs,
and other material generated through or as a result of
the study are the exclusive property of the Band,” that
“there shall be joint copyright between the Permittee
and the Band over any such publications, unless other-
wise agreed between the parties,” and that “all material
found or generated by the proponent as a result of her-
itage investigations shall be deemed the property of the
Kamloops Indian Band.” How effective is this agreement,
and what rights are ceded upon signing? The provisions
of the archaeological permit refer to physical property/
results but do not specifically mention intellectual prop-
erty ownership aside from “joint copyright.” The pro-
visions do, however, specifically include “data,” and the
fact that the term is not defined enables the Kamloops
Band to interpret it broadly, perhaps allowing some forms
of intellectual property to be included.
Should such permits explicitly include reference to in-
tellectual property rights? If so, is it possible or likely
that at some point a contemporary Aboriginal group will
lay claim to a major archaeological site and exercise ex-
clusive control over the site name, images of the arti-
facts, or related items? What if there are competing in-
terests due to overlapping land claims (e.g., Franklin and
Bunte 1994)? These are complex control issues that have
yet to arise. It is important to note, however, that re-
gaining control, such as repatriation of human remains,
is often just the beginning of a series of related chal-
lenges; control of knowledge or resources without the
capacity to manage them can have significant conse-
quences. As Winter and Henry (1997:222) note,
An associated issue is the intrinsic power of exca-
vated materials. While the [Saanich] Society has a
responsibility for the preservation of artifacts of cul-
tural, artistic, and historical value to the Saanich
people, in some cases it is difficult to accept such
objects. Some artifacts carry with them a constella-
tion of responsibilities. To accept care of certain ar-
tifacts brings onerous cultural and spiritual obliga-
tions. Some need extensive ritual care. Some
artifacts may only be returned to individuals who
are culturally appropriate by reason of family, lin-
eage, gender, or initiation. Such people may not be
available, or may not be willing to personally under-
take the effort and personal expense.
control through intellectual property
ownership mechanisms
Beyond contractual approaches to controlling Indigenous
cultural and intellectual property, existing intellectual
property ownership tools are beginning to be employed.
Academic researchers are increasingly required to ne-
gotiate issues related to publication, including standard
copyright issues (authorship and moral rights), editorial
control (restrictions on publication), and benefit sharing.
For example, “joint copyright between the Permittee and
the Band” for all resulting publications is required by the
heritage investigation permit of the Kamloops Indian
Band referred to above. With most archaeological
publications, copyright is held by the publishers. With
greater collaboration between archaeologists and Abo-
riginal communities, publishers will need to accom-
modate the need for more flexible copyright arrange-
ments. This is already under way with some ethno-
botany publications (e.g., Turner 1997, 1998). Further-
more, some archaeologists have turned over copyright to
the Indigenous peoples with whom they work (e.g., Rob-
erts 2002). Sharing or transferring copyright may require
(and benefit from) review by the community collabora-
tor(s) prior to publication—an extension of existing con-
cepts of peer review to include community experts. Such
collaborative approaches to publication, however, often
require additional time. Another issue is copyright own-
ership and access to photographs of Aboriginal designs,
which raises the question which of these is the true cre-
ation or artistic work, the design or the photograph. Here
one could suggest a parallel with the patenting of isolated
and purified plant chemicals by drug companies that use
cultural knowledge as a guide; which creativity is most
deserving of protection, the laboratory manipulation or
the original knowledge?
Trademark is also gaining recognition as a potentially
useful legal tool for protecting Indigenous images and
designs. For example, several members of Pauktuutit, a
Canadian Inuit women’s organization, are currently ex-
amining how a variation on trademark that they term a
“cultural property mark” might be employed to protect
the amauti, an innovative traditional form of clothing
with both practical and holistic attributes. The concept
of a cultural property mark is similar to a trademark but
would apply to the collective knowledge of Indigenous
peoples rather than the knowledge of individuals or cor-
porations (Blackduck 2001a, b). Aboriginal groups in
British Columbia such as the Cowichan Band Council
have registered certain words as “certification marks”
(another form of trademark) for commercial use. For ex-
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ample, “Cowichan,” “Genuine Cowichan,” and “Gen-
uine Cowichan Approved” are registered for use in the
marketing of handmade clothing created by Coast Salish
knitters using traditional materials, methods, and pat-
terns.31 These marks have potential application in the
protection or promotion of other aspects of cultural her-
itage. While trademark use typically involves protection
of exclusive rights to an image intended for commercial
purposes, defensive uses of trademark law have been doc-
umented. In February 2000 the Snuneymuxw Nation
successfully registered some ancient petroglyphs in their
traditional territory as “official marks” to prevent their
being copied and reproduced by anyone for any purpose,
arguing that they are sacred and copying them for any
reason would be sacrilegious (Associated Press 2000,
Tanner 2000). The Comox Indian Band has protected the
place-name of a sacred site, Queneesh,32 as an official
mark.
Patents may seem unrelated to archaeological re-
search. At the molecular level, however, archaeological
research may involve the recovery of ancient DNA, a
potentially patentable material.33 DNA has, for example,
been extracted from 8,000-year-old brain tissue (Doran
et al. 1986). Access to and study of DNA from contem-
porary populations is a very contentious issue, in part
because it brings up serious issues of privacy and prior
informed consent but also because the genetic infor-
mation derived through analysis may be seen as a val-
uable commodity. Given that human genetic material is
patentable in Canada, the United States, and many Eu-
ropean countries, one can speculate that if, for example,
ancient DNA from prehistoric human remains were to
play a critical role in informing future medical treat-
ments for contemporary diseases there might be impor-
tant issues to be resolved regarding both cultural heritage
and intellectual property rights. At best, intellectual
property and other laws offer a piecemeal approach to
protecting certain aspects of cultural heritage. This con-
trasts with the blanket approach that Brown (2003:209)
calls “total heritage protection” and describes as “a be-
nign form of quarantine that safeguards all elements of
cultural life. Entire cultures would thus be defined as
off-limits to scrutiny and exploitation. Within this shel-
tering umbrella, communities would remain free to de-
vise appropriate ways to defend their philosophical or
31. Canadian Intellectual Property Office web site (http://strate-
gis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/0792/trdp079217400e.html).
32. Canadian Intellectual Property Office web site (http://strate-
gis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/0908/trdp090857300e.html).
33. For example, deCODE Genetics of Delaware has been creating
databases of Icelanders’ genes and their medical and genealogical
records. The company cross-references these data and markets
them and other bioinformatics software products to drug developers
(Industry Standard web site [http://www.thestandard.com/compa-
nies/dossier/0,1922,276205,00.html]). DeCODE “will license the
genes that it discovers (all of which it intends to patent) to drug-
makers only if they agree to provide medicines developed as a result
to all Icelanders without charge” (Gibbs 1998). The Mannvernd
Association for Ethics in Science and Medicine in Iceland is op-
posing the databases through a lawsuit on the grounds that they
violate human rights (http://mannvernd.is).
scientific or artistic achievements.” He points out the
contradictions inherent in this approach (pp. 217–18):
To defend indigenous peoples, it promotes official
boundaries that separate one kind of native person
from another, and native persons from non-native
ones, thereby threatening the fluidity of ethnic and
family identities typically found in aboriginal com-
munities. In the name of defending indigenous
traditions, it forces the elusive qualities of entire
civilizations—everything from attitudes and bodily
postures to agricultural techniques—into ready-made
legal categories, among which “heritage” and “cul-
ture” are only the most far-reaching. In the interest
promoting diversity, Total Heritage Protection im-
poses procedural norms that have the paradoxical ef-
fect of flattening cultural difference.
While much of the recent intellectual property rights
discussion has centered on the use or expansion of existing
legal mechanisms, Brown (1998:199) contends that this
strategy serves primarily to “convert information into
property” but that “property discourse replaces [emphasis
ours] what should be extensive discussion on the moral
implications of exposing Native people to unwanted scru-
tiny, on the one hand, and sequestering public-domain
information, on the other.” We strongly support Brown’s
call (p. 202) for “public discussion about mutual respect
and the fragility of native cultures in mass societies.”
Given that the establishment of an adequate process for
such a dialogue has been slow, however, we suggest that
the existing legal and nonlegal protection mechanisms
discussed herein merit consideration.
cultural prospecting? lessons from other
disciplines
Non-Indigenous archaeologists have long held a monop-
oly on the recovery of prehistoric materials and scientific
knowledge of past peoples. In general, they have also
profited the most from archaeological research in the
sense of creating personal careers and building their pro-
fessional field. Indeed, archaeological exploration of the
past could be viewed as cultural prospecting, parallel to
biodiversity prospecting. This being the case, are there
lessons to be gleaned from the current intellectual prop-
erty rights debate in ethnobotany? Archaeology is based
on physical evidence that is often seen as lacking in con-
temporary value. In contrast, the intellectual contribu-
tions (e.g., language, traditional plant knowledge) of liv-
ing Indigenous societies are integral to ethonobotany and
are in many cases highly regarded in contemporary hu-
man and environmental health applications. Some ar-
chaeological research products are protected by federal,
state, or provincial laws. While such legislation appears
to be inadequate to protect cultural and intellectual prop-
erty, it is often supplemented by well-developed local
protocols, contracts, and/or permit systems. By compar-
ison, no provincial or federal policy in Canada specifi-
cally limits access to or use of ethnobotanical knowledge
342 F current anthropology Volume 45, Number 3, June 2004
or plant biodiversity on public lands. The ethnobotanical
research policies and guidelines that have been devel-
oped are mainly institutionally derived (i.e., university,
industry, professional society). Relevant international
statements and declarations are emerging (e.g., Kari-Oca
Declaration 1992, Mataatua Declaration 1993), but pro-
tocols developed by Indigenous groups themselves are
largely recent developments.34
Through publication of their data, archaeologists in-
crease access to the historical record, as archaeological
information is often not readily available to communi-
ties. Not surprisingly, copyright relating to the publi-
cation of results has been largely perceived as the main
intellectual property issue, although there is the poten-
tial for patent issues and trademark applications are
emerging. Indeed, if marketers can seek and often gain
legal protection of “proprietary” phrases, symbols,
names, and even odors (see Brown 2003:76), then the
notion of Indigenous peoples’ seeking protection for
medicine wheels, rock art, or other aspects of their cul-
tural heritage cannot be viewed as outlandish or un-
precedented. In ethnobotany, by comparison, publication
raises important issues (see Bannister and Barrett n.d.,
2001; Laird et al. 2002), but copyright is viewed as in-
adequate protection in that it serves only to limit the
physical reproduction of published works rather than
protecting their intellectual components. Copyright is
also very difficult to monitor or enforce. Patents are the
mechanisms of choice for researchers interested in pro-
tecting intellectual property rights to “inventions” with
commercial potential based on traditional plant knowl-
edge. Ethnobotanists are increasingly having to consider
patent issues and trade secrecy (fiduciary duty) in con-
nection with traditional medicines or foods.
Significant differences between archaeology and eth-
nobotany are obvious in the types of information sought
and the ways in which that information is utilized. Ar-
chaeology and ethnobotany approach intellectual prop-
erty issues from opposite ends of the spectrum—archae-
ology from the material record of past culture with
supposed limited present use and ethnobotany from the
intellectual aspects (and related biological resources) of
living (or recently living) peoples with perceived high
contemporary value. Perhaps the two disciplines can in-
form one another. Archaeologists have the potential to
become leaders in dealing with issues of intellectual
property rights in their own field by becoming aware of
debates in related disciplines and considering their
implications.
34. Examples of protocols or guidelines developed by indigenous
groups include Guidelines for Respecting Cultural Knowledge
(Alaska Native Knowledge Network) (http://www.ankn.uaf.edu/
standards/knowledge.html), Mi’kmaq Research Principles and Pro-
tocols (http://mrc.uccb.ns.ca/mci/default.htm), Code of Ethics for
Researchers Conducting Research Concerning the Ktunaxa Nation
(http://www.law.ualberta.ca/research/aboriginalculturalheritage/
casestudies.htm), and ‘Namgis First Nation Guidelines for Visiting
Researchers/Access to Information (http://www.law.ualberta.ca/
research/aboriginalculturalheritage/casestudies.htm).
costewardship of the future
Unless archaeologists consider the implications of ex-
isting intellectual property laws and the subject matter
that might lead to intellectual property disputes (e.g.,
publication of academic research, fiduciary duties with
regard to secret knowledge, reproduction of images of
cultural artifacts or symbols, use of traditional knowl-
edge derived from archaeological digs) they may be
caught unawares by restrictions on data access or use
imposed on them by tribes that have gained legal rights
or developed the capacity to conduct research on their
own. The situation is analogous in some respects to the
events leading up to drafting of the NAGPRA. For dec-
ades professional archaeologists and their antiquarian
predecessors were complacent about the recovery and
treatment of human skeletal remains, assuming that
they had the unlimited right to claim these precontact
materials for their own use and that Native Americans
had little or no interest in those materials (see Thomas
2000 for overview). Those who held this view were
“shocked and outraged” by the ease of passage of this
powerful piece of legislation (e.g., Meighan 1992).
We advocate a more active role for archaeologists
working with Indigenous peoples (or on Indigenous ter-
ritories) in considering the implications of their research.
We believe that solutions to disputes between archae-
ologists (or archaeology) and tribes will be found in the
recognition of what archaeological knowledge means
and what control of that knowledge means beyond sim-
ply economics or professional rewards and advancement.
There must be recognition of ethical obligations at both
the individual and the collective level. Adopting partic-
ipatory research approaches, supporting meaningful col-
laboration with Indigenous colleagues, sharing decision-
making responsibilities and benefits in research
processes and outcomes, and working cooperatively with
all those who have an interest in Indigenous cultural
heritage will be key to identifying, understanding, and
addressing the conflicts that may arise in claiming own-
ership of the past.
Comments
michael f . brown
Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Williams
College, Williamstown, MA 01267, U.S.A. (mbrown@
williams.edu). 14 i 04
Nicholas and Bannister have done anthropology a great
service by offering these reflections on archaeology’s
place in the contemporary debate about indigenous in-
tellectual property and its protection. On the principle
that praise, however justified, makes for dull reading, I
will comment briefly on two elements of their argument
that merit clarification.
A persistent flaw of contemporary writing about in-
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digenous intellectual property rights is that it rarely sit-
uates the issues within the broader context of informa-
tion ecology, on the one hand, and the political dilemmas
of pluralist democracy, on the other. For instance, there
is much talk about the implementation of special pro-
tections for indigenous intellectual property rights but
little concern for how these arrangements might spill
over into information policies elsewhere in society—in
science, industry, public life, and so on. Likewise, ad-
vocates of expansive indigenous intellectual property
rights assume that the nature of indigenous sovereignty
facilitates the compartmentalization of special protec-
tions so that only indigenous groups are affected. As I
have argued elsewhere (Brown 2003:222–27), however,
sovereignty is a problematic doctrine when applied to
culture in general and knowledge in particular. The ca-
sual and, in my view, erroneous assumption that the
“repatriation” of knowledge is identical to the repatri-
ation of objects is part of the problem. Knowledge an-
swers to different rules. It is also more readily manipu-
lated, to the potential detriment of intellectual exchange
and political freedom. I hope I am not alone in dreading
the day when history comes to be regarded as the exclu-
sive intellectual property of specific interest groups, in-
digenous or otherwise.
My doubts intersect Nicholas and Bannister’s argu-
ments in a few places. For instance, they note that ar-
chaeologists’ accounts threaten the “sanctity of Indige-
nous beliefs” by offering views of history that contradict
indigenous ones. The same can be said about the impact
of archaeology on the beliefs of those Christians who
reject the study of human evolution in favor of biblical
versions of prehistory. Must archaeologists therefore
mute their professional opinions lest creationists have
their feelings hurt and their theology undermined? What
about the highly spiritualized notions of history em-
braced by devout Muslims, Mormons, Orthodox Jews,
and other religious groups? Unless Nicholas and Ban-
nister are saying that archaeologists have an ethical ob-
ligation to scrub all potentially hurtful facts and asser-
tions from scientific accounts, they need to explain why
“sensitivity” in one case is an ethical imperative and in
the other a matter of no concern at all. The rejoinder
that the belief systems of indigenous peoples are more
vulnerable than those held by followers of major world
religions is accurate but more or less irrelevant, given
the tendency of liberal democracies to insist that the
same rules apply to everyone.
I am also uneasy about the upbeat belief that collab-
oration between archaeologists and indigenous com-
munities will resolve all questions about the ownership
and control of archaeological information. Collaboration
is a good thing, of course, and I find Nicholas and Ban-
nister’s own success in collaborative research entirely
praiseworthy. But if we take the hypothetical statement
“I signed a collaborative research agreement with First
Nation X that assigns copyright to the community and
gives it power over what I say in my publications” and
then replace “First Nation X” with “Microsoft” or “the
National Rifle Association” or the name of any other
group or institution in society, one immediately recog-
nizes that the ethics of prior editorial review are far
murkier than they seem at first glance. I would welcome
guidance from Nicholas and Bannister about where one
draws the line between legitimate collaboration and the
willful surrender of professional truth standards in order
to secure a research permit.
Happily, such stark contrasts between indigenous and
scientific perspectives are more the stuff of academic
debate than of the real world, where native people and
anthropologists have shown themselves capable of learn-
ing to shuttle between apparently irreconcilable ways of
knowing (see, e.g., Ferguson 1996, Loring 2001, Watkins
2000). Nicholas and Bannister offer a vision of how ar-
chaeologists can rethink disciplinary practices to build
the level of trust that makes movement between cultural
worlds the norm rather than the exception. We may
never get to a place where the divide between indigenous
and nonindigenous views of history and prehistory dis-
appears completely, but this essay suggests paths worth
following, questions worth asking, in anthropology’s
quest for more ethical ways to pursue research on the
human condition.
yannis hamilakis
Archaeology, School of Humanities, University of
Southampton, Avenue Campus, Southampton S17 1BF,
U.K. (y.hamilakis@soton.ac.uk). 20 i 04
In 1992 a Coca-Cola advertisement published first in an
Italian newspaper caused a furore in Greece because it
included a manipulated photograph of the Parthenon
with its columns refashioned as Coca-Cola bottles.
Much of the press and several public commentators and
politicians condemned the “sacrilege” committed on the
national symbol, the ownership rights of which are seen
as belonging firmly to Greece (cf. Hamilakis and Yalouri
1996). More or less at the same time, a diplomatic and
political dispute arose between the same country and one
of its northern neighbours, the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia. The clash, which threatened the geopo-
litical stability of the region, was apparently over the
symbols chosen for the newly established national flag
of the latter country: a widely found decorative motif
from ancient Macedonia but one which has been asso-
ciated with the Vergina excavations in Greek Macedonia.
Greece claimed that the choice constituted a theft of a
national symbol, an act indicating expansionist aspira-
tions (cf. Brown 1994).
These two cases help to illustrate the point that the
phenomenon discussed by Nicholas and Bannister is al-
ready at the heart of a number of conflicts and at the
intersection of cultural, political, and diplomatic wars.
These cases also show that the phenomenon is highly
diverse rather than simply something to do with what we
call indigenous communities. Nicholas and Bannister’s
discussion touches upon a number of important issues and
makes significant points, but it deploys a variety of loaded
concepts that need unpacking: “property,” “copying
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and replication” (and, by implication, “authenticity”),
“rights,” and “stewardship of the past and its material
traces.” It also makes certain assumptions about the na-
ture of archaeological practice which are far from being
settled and universally accepted. “Stewardship,” for ex-
ample, while it is conventionally accepted (and enshrined
in various archaeological codes of ethics and practice) as
the archaeologist’s primary ethical and professional re-
sponsibility, is increasingly recognized as ontologically
and epistemologically problematic and ethically self-serv-
ing. The “record” has not been entrusted to archaeologists,
who then become its stewards; rather, archaeologists are
instrumental in producing that record out of the frag-
mented material traces of past social practices. Their self-
appointed role as stewards of that record, therefore, is eth-
ically spurious and may imply the desire to exclude others
from engaging with the material traces of the past (cf.
Hamilakis 1999, 2003). If the concept of stewardship is
therefore an inadequate basis upon which to discuss issues
of ethics and responsibility, the notion of shared steward-
ship (involving various indigenous groups and publics as
well as archaeologists) that Nicholas and Bannister pro-
pose can be equally problematic. It simply extends the
authority of archaeologists’ own problematic concepts to
incorporate indigenous groups and publics rather than
imagining new concepts and forging new modes of en-
gagement.
While I would contend that the underlying issues have
to do with the epistemology and the ethics (and, by im-
plication, the politics) of archaeological practice and are
therefore inadequately explored within a legalistic frame-
work, the discourse on intellectual and cultural property
can act as a “forceful sound bite” (Strathern 1998:217); in
other words, it can open up space for inequities to be
debated and power dynamics exposed. The debates on the
restitution of cultural property, for example, are often en-
tangled with legal, objectifying and depoliticizing argu-
ments and ignore the essentialist and static conceptions
of identity that often underpin these claims. At the same
time, however, they have made possible a debate on co-
lonialist and imperialist archaeological and anthropolog-
ical practices and exposed structures of exploitation that
would have otherwise gone unexplored. The various eth-
ical and political clashes are context-specific, and as such
they demand a context-specific response that takes into
account the power inequalities and dynamics in each case.
For example, in the present climate of the commodifi-
cation of the past, the domination of neoliberal econom-
ics, and the tyranny of the market, a defense of the concept
of the public sphere and of common property is an urgent
need. That discourse of the public domain, however, may
be deployed in such a way as to deprive marginalized and
disenfranchised people of the only “resources” left to
them: cultural artifacts, knowledge, and ideas. To return
to the two case studies that I started with, legal frame-
works would have been completely inadequate here, as
the issues involved have to do with conceptions of na-
tional identity, ancestry, and ideas of cultural superiority,
as well as issues of authenticity and its authority. An ex-
ploration of these issues would have led us to the very
heart of the matter at hand: the genesis of the discipline
of archaeology as a device of Western modernity which
was called upon to create “facts on the ground,” the ma-
terial signifiers of national and European identities—a dis-
course that in the following centuries would be appropri-
ated, modified, and deployed in various ways as a potent
weapon in various political negotiations and clashes.
sven ouzman
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“Make everything count not once, but three times” was
the formative maternal advice given to that grasping
agent of empire, Lord Baden-Powell, to guide his sub-
jugation of the indigenous in India. This “audit culture”
(Strathern 2000) has not diminished, and anthropology
and archaeology both support and question knowledge
corporatization (Ouzman 2003). Knowledge systems and
their control have a direct impact on the futures of these
intertwined disciplines. In solidarity with the rich ideas
of this article I examine two key issues—the valence and
violence of words and archaeology’s object-centricity—
before considering indigenous and archaeological knowl-
edge-system entanglements.
This article should more have strictly defined words
like “native,” “indigenous,” and “aboriginal,” especially
with the authors lamenting a “lack of consistent ter-
minology.” Evaluating intellectual property rights re-
quires clear terms of reference that are also capable of
nuance. There are, for example, different scales of indi-
geneity, not all synonymous with “First Nation” status.
Also, homogenizing the “West” elides the diversity of
Western intellectual property rights. It would have been
interesting had the approach of historical archaeologists,
often Westerners studying their own history, been jux-
taposed with indigenous archaeological practice. Adding
“citizen(ship)” and “authentic” and dwelling longer on
“sovereignty” would have better shown people’s ability
both to participate in a larger nationhood and to maintain
a distinct identity that is not a “subnationhood” but
supranational and capable of making nation-states de-
cidedly uneasy.
Intellectual property rights conflict often involves ma-
terial culture, which combines with a notion of “heri-
tage” as a largely open-access realm to form a deadly
combination predisposed to conflictual rights-speak. Mi-
chael Brown’s warning that this legalistic trajectory de-
flects attention from indigenous people’s rights not to
have their past or present studied highlights a central
tension over access to ideas and cultural material other
than one’s own (Brown 2003). But I do not agree that the
price of access is only disseminating morally positive
findings, replacing divisive colonial stereotypes with in-
clusive postcolonial ones. Censorship and intellectual-
freedom concerns need nonetheless to acknowledge that
access is not a right but a set of negotiated practices.
This is the case even if an originator or custodial indig-
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enous community is not easily identifiable—and here
longer discussion dealing with such absence in the oth-
erwise excellent access-process-product section would
have been welcome. Perhaps less simplistic notions of
time are needed. “Westerners” do use elliptical time
(Kondratieff cycles), and indigenes situationally use lin-
ear time (they meet deadlines). May we not productively
understand “tradition” as a fund of knowledge, objects,
places, and people that permits innovation (Ranger 1993),
allowing temporalities to soften and interdigitate? As-
sociating indigenous people with the past can imply an
inability to deal with the present. This article’s discus-
sion of strategic indigenous usage of “Western” legal
mechanisms helps counter this perception.
Acknowledgment of the past’s ever-presence and crea-
tivity is sorely needed by a “First” World mired in man-
aging material culture. The recent dispute over a ca. 9,400-
year-old person’s remains exposes “Western” legal inertia
(Hurst-Thomas 2000). If indigenous sovereignty is hon-
ored in letter and spirit, disputes between nations have
many mediatory possibilities, but a single jurisprudence
routinely and authoritatively adjudicating disputes is not
one of them. In Australian “keeping places,” for example,
objects enjoy graded access (see, e.g., http://www.dcdsca.
nt.gov.au/dcdsca/intranet.nsf/pages/strehlowresearchcen-
tre). Some objects are accessible only by their originator
communities, while other objects and associated knowl-
edge require negotiated access with indigenous gatekeep-
ers. This is one way in which intellectual property rights
issues are “stretching the existing legal categories” by of-
fering blurring as a space for conflict resolution in which
the “intangible” can be accommodated in discussions of
“reasonable doubt.” Similarly, how would St. Lawrence
islanders’ subsistence looting allow less judgmental un-
derstandings of “looting” in Iraq (Hamilakis 2003)? En-
gaging with indigenous intellectual property rights is good
science because it allows evaluation through multiple en-
abling and constraining criteria (Wylie 2000). In return,
perhaps archaeology can act as therapy. At the risk of
lapsing into California confessionalism, as a part-Afrika-
ner whose ancestors authored apartheid I find the repet-
itive techniques of archaeological surveillance useful in
confronting my ancestry. Archaeological study of the past-
as-present engenders broad-based debate on intellectual
property rights. For example, incorporating a San rock
painting and motto into South Africa’s coat of arms (with-
out indigenous consultation; Smith et al. 2000) came at
the cost of state copyright over images of declared heritage
for the benefit of the “nation,” thereby undermining First
Nation sovereignty. Similarly, well-intentioned New Age
homages to indigenous sacred sites assume unproblematic
access in the name of a politically lame “humanity” (e.g.,
Finn 1997). These debates may help broaden the binary
archaeologist-indigenous interaction, allowing more con-
sensual construction of best practice. We can ask whether
ethnography is not just a vehicle for neoliberal values and
whether indigenous gerontocracies would benefit from al-
ternative governance. Willful ignorance of intellectual
property rights leads to an avoidance of people and re-
sponsibilities—even moving into “site-less fields” where
the human barely factors (Helmreich 2003). Cooperative
and politically engaged research is not to everyone’s lik-
ing, but we all need to be able to decide whether intel-
lectual property rights should become an intrinsic part of
archaeology.
karen d. v itell i
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This is an important paper, and I hope that all my col-
leagues will read it, think about it, and, probably most
important, talk about it, especially with colleagues in
other disciplines. (Photography, for example, has long
and complex experience with intellectual property rights
issues, and folklore and ethnomusicology could also be
added to those mentioned by Nicholas and Bannister.)
As I read this paper I could feel (and confess to sharing,
initially) a rising sense of panic among colleagues who
are already making Herculean efforts to be fully ethical
archaeologists as yet another thing is added to the long
string of issues we must consider. Those who are still
chafing over NAGPRA and proclaiming the death of sci-
ence may respond with anger. But intellectual property
issues are out there, and we will have to deal with them,
whether we choose to prepare now or wait for another
Kennewick. Certainly those of us who have focused on
the practice of archaeological ethics have found that
calm, earnest discussion among all affected parties meet-
ing as equals before a crisis erupts is the best hope for
reaching mutually acceptable outcomes. Although I have
no direct experience of such negotiations with indige-
nous groups, my work with a local community in Greece
has taught me that relinquishing some control actually
brings many rewards, some far greater than any I have
found in the academic community. We might also re-
member that we already accept many limitations on
what we publish—site locations come to mind, along
with various restrictions imposed by editors, reviewers,
and publishers.
We should also think carefully about our own intel-
lectual property rights. What do archaeologists bring,
uniquely, to the work they produce? Can we separate our
contributions from the data? What are the implications
for the group and for archaeology of turning over all ex-
cavation and survey records to an indigenous group?
Reply
george p . nicholas and kelly p .
bannister
Kamloops, B.C., Canada. 23 ii 04
The commentators support many of our primary points.
The issues are of course broader than our stated focus
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on Indigenous contexts, as Hamilakis suggests; in his
examples it is not simply a question of academic dis-
course but one of real geopolitical consequence. Explo-
ration of intellectual property rights in archaeology will
make all stakeholders more aware of the issues that he
raises with respect to “archaeology as a device of Western
modernity”; the discipline cannot shake off its coloni-
alist legacy until we examine who benefits from the pro-
duction of knowledge. Aboriginal complaints about
threats to their cultural heritage have tended to be rec-
ognized only when framed as a political strategy, which
ignores the very real threats to and loss of integrity of
their cultural heritage, past and present. Widespread ap-
propriation by advertisers of the inukshuk (the standing
stone figures of the Canadian Arctic) (Logan 2003) may
be no less damaging to the Inuit than the incorporation
of contested symbols in Hamilakis’s Macedonian flag
example, but his example is more likely to be viewed as
an intellectual property issue because of its greater vis-
ibility on the world political stage. The point is to rec-
ognize the many contexts in which intellectual property
rights may apply and learn how to negotiate for more
equitable terms.
We agree with Brown that the wider implications of
Indigenous intellectual property rights cannot be ig-
nored, but his point can be turned on its head to examine
the lack of attention to Indigenous intellectual-property-
rights-related issues in the information policies to which
he points. Could the “talk . . . of special protections for
indigenous intellectual property rights” be largely a re-
action to this? In other words, are Indigenous groups
often being “cornered” into considering intellectual
property rights protections to prevent others from ap-
propriating and commodifying aspects of their culture?
Violet Ford, vice president of the Inuit Circumpolar Con-
ference, which represents some 145,000 Inuit people,
notes that “more than 100 individuals and companies in
Canada alone have applied for a copyright on the Inuk-
shuk” (quoted in Logan 2003).
Hamilakis points to the inadequacy of legal frame-
works for a discussion of Indigenous intellectual prop-
erty rights, while Brown points out that knowledge is
“more readily manipulated” than objects. Indeed, just as
the line between cultural property and intellectual prop-
erty is blurred in an Indigenous context, so too are the
divisions between ethics, ideology, and law. It is impor-
tant to understand the parallels and differences and to
explore the potential legal and moral mechanisms for
redress that may yet evolve. Claims will be constructed
in the interests of those who put forward the argument,
and the rationales for these claims require exposure (see
Hollowell 2003).
Brown equates the potential impact of archaeology on
Indigenous cultures with the “hurt feelings” of Chris-
tians, but we are talking about insensitive promotion of
views (presented as “scientific” and thus unquestiona-
ble) that are contrary to the “stories and beliefs” held by
descendant communities. The vulnerability of Indige-
nous belief systems is highly relevant to our argument
(Nicholas 2004). The fiduciary responsibility to Aborig-
inal peoples acknowledged by the Canadian government
is evidence that equally applying the “rules” of Western
society to non-Western societies is in some cases
inequitable.
Ouzman notes that we should have more strictly de-
fined “Native,” “Indigenous,” and other terms, and
Hamilakas refers to “loaded concepts.” Terminology is
very important, but our terms have been defined else-
where (e.g., Brown 1998, Janke 1998) and we sought to
move the discussion beyond terminology. Further dis-
cussion will lead to a more nuanced treatment of these
terms that is much needed. We are encouraged to see
anthropologists such as Michael Brown and Julie Hol-
lowell and archaeologists such as Anne Pyburn, Lynn
Meskell, and Larry Zimmerman addressing these issues.
Hamilakis raises the issue of stewardship, but we are
not promoting the type of stewardship he and others (e.g.,
Wylie 2002, 2004) have critiqued. What is needed is a
more critical and pluralistic perspective on stewardship
as a negotiated practice—a recognition that for some
groups stewardship means just the opposite of what it
does in, say, a museum context. Furthermore, while we
agree with Hamilakis regarding the need for less archae-
ocentric stewardship, we consider it presumptuous to
offer alternatives on behalf of descendant communities.
Brown’s uneasiness about “collaboration” may stem
from his somewhat superficial treatment of the concept.
We are not suggesting Indigenous “power over” what is
said (e.g., veto), even though the power inequities of con-
ventional academic research favor the researcher over
the researched; rather, we call for sharing of power for
both moral and practical reasons. Indeed, a participatory
approach to research implies that academics ought to be
able to (as Brown notes) “replace First Nation X” with
any other group in society to share the benefits, risks,
responsibilities, and decision making of research. Power
sharing is, however, an unpopular concept in academe;
ultimately it is the awareness, preparedness, and integ-
rity of the individual that will influence whether the line
is placed closer to “legitimate collaboration” or to the
“surrender of professional truth standards.”
We have learned firsthand the realities of collaboration
with Indigenous colleagues and communities. It was not
our intention to suggest “working together” as the so-
lution. We firmly believe that informed and honest di-
alogue is the way to go, but there are often hurdles to
overcome (Nicholas and Andrews 1997). Mutual respect
is key (see Clifford 2004:5). The issues that we address
here are not simply legal but ethical matters. The legal
definition of intellectual property is narrow but dynamic.
Most archaeologists, however, will confront intellectual
property rights issues in terms of soft law and customary
law, in the form of negotiated agreements, protocols, in-
ternational standards, and what is agreed upon as ethical
practice. In addition to the general guidelines currently
available (e.g., Wax 1991, Wood and Powell 1993, Zim-
merman, Vitelli, and Hollowell-Zimmer 2003), we hope
to see some specific to intellectual property issues ar-
chaeology in the near future.
Brown hopes that he is not alone in dreading the day
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“when history comes to be regarded as the exclusive
intellectual property of specific interest groups, indige-
nous or otherwise.” We are not promoting or defending
copyright or other restrictions on the exchange of knowl-
edge (legal or not) as the answer. All restrictions on
knowledge flow have a cost. Unrestricted access to in-
formation is, however, rare in human societies. Restric-
tions on access to or use of information emerge when it
acquires or is seen as having the potential to acquire
value. Ouzman rightly notes that access is not a right
but a set of negotiated practices. Archaeologists already
negotiate access to information at many different levels,
ranging from seeking permission to reproduce illustra-
tions to obtaining permits or access to restricted site-
inventory files or submitting applications to university
ethics committees. Is it unreasonable to be expected to
seek permission to do certain things with archaeological
data from the descendants of those who created the ar-
tifacts and sites in the first place?
Vitelli’s point concerning how we deal with the unique
intellectual contributions that researchers bring to the
data goes to the heart of the matter (also see Chippendale
2003). In signing protocols with the various First Nations
with whom we work, we are no less concerned about
giving up rights to our own research contributions. The
key is meaningful dialogue on ways of doing things. “Ne-
gotiation” is often taken to mean a surrender of some
type, but it is a form of dialogue, and an important el-
ement of successful dialogue is establishing an under-
standing of different points of view (see Wood and Powell
1993).
Perhaps the next step is to begin to understand the
foundations of these concerns and their cultural-histor-
ical-political contexts. As Hamalakis notes, “rights” are
often constructed to meet the needs of a specific situa-
tion. Archaeologists are not used to thinking in terms of
how contemporary peoples make use of the past. We
hope that our paper will serve both as an invitation to
“unpack” some of these questions of terminology, ac-
cess, and control and as a challenge to do so.
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